All Zionist military formations suffered a “historic and unprecedented” failure in repelling the Palestinian Resistance’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, as their preparedness was deemed “zero”, an investigation conducted by the Zionist military, the findings of which were published on Thursday, revealed.
The regime’s Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) failed to understand Hamas for years, the probe highlighted.
The occupationnewspaper Maariv cited senior military officials as saying that “the failure has historical dimensions and requires study for generations.” A high-ranking source added that the investigations do not provide reassuring explanations.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas successfully struck the regimes military’s command and control within the first minutes of its multifaceted operation, which involved land, air, and sea assaults.
Zionist media reported that most field commanders—ranging from platoon and company leaders to battalion commanders—were killed at the outset of the attack, including three brigade commanders.
The military’s investigations pointed to a complete lack of preparedness across all formations, including the collapse of intelligence from both Aman and the Shin Bet, highlighting that the military’s Gaza Division “was defeated within the first two hours of the operation.”
According to Maariv, the military has conducted 77 investigations into the war, divided into five categories: general assessments of Hamas’ operational framework, intelligence failures, decision-making on the night of October 6–7, the military’s response to the attack, and battle-specific inquiries.
At the core of these investigations lies the central question: How did the regime find itself under such a deadly attack without any of its intelligence formations providing a warning? How did the occupation allow the Palestinian Resistance to “grow and develop just meters from ‘Israeli’ settlements along the border”?
Hamas planned the operation for over a decade
Maariv also revealed that Hamas had been planning the operation for more than a decade. Zionist military investigations indicate that the main catalyst for the regime’s collapse on October 7 was the 2021 so-called “Guardian of the Walls” operation, after which Hamas began to recognize its ability to defeat the occupation.
According to the newspaper, Hamas worked on multiple levels, with a particular focus on building its capabilities to execute its strategic operational plan. Simultaneously, the Palestinian group initiated a deception scheme that occupation military officials describe as one of the largest in military history.
The military’s investigations further revealed that Hamas was on the verge of executing its operation twice before October 7 but called it off at the last minute: first in October 2022 and again in April 2023 during the Jewish Passover holiday.
On both previous occasions—as well as on October 7 itself—both Aman and Shin Bet failed to anticipate the attack or issue a warning about it.
The newspaper stressed that for an entire decade, both Zionist military and political leaders believed Hamas was deterred and shifting toward a settlement, whereas, in reality, Hamas’ leadership—under Yahya Sinwar and his team—was preparing for the October 7 operation.
The investigations described the regime as “blind” on multiple levels—political, military, and intelligence—having failed to anticipate the attack and suffering from a persistent gap in understanding reality.
They also identified at least 10 signs over the years that could have indicated the occupations misjudgment, yet they were ignored.
“Zionist blindness”, the investigations clarified, was rooted in an organizational culture that had become deeply entrenched across the entire security establishment in recent years.
Within the military and at the political level, no one challenged decisions from higher ranks, creating a distorted reality in which, even when unusual intelligence surfaced, analysts within Aman and Shin Bet sought to justify existing assumptions about Hamas’ intentions rather than question them.
The investigations also pointed to a problematic “intelligence culture” that operated on the assumption that “‘Israel’ knew” everything, rather than questioning whether there were fundamental gaps in its understanding.
The newspaper noted that within the Zionist military, there is a consensus that the investigations are difficult and that the military has much to learn and rectify.
However, senior officers believe the investigations must be taken a step further—through the establishment of a formal commission of inquiry to examine the failures of October 7 and everything that preceded it.