Some time ago (26/2/2025), as I had published the text «Revolutionaries are not “corrected” nor “morally improved”»*, the Lamia Misdemeanor Council had rejected my request for conditional release for the umpteenth time. As I had also said, the fact that I will now serve my entire sentence, all 5/5, is the result of the general tightening, the last time, of penal and “penitentiary” repression, which in turn is a consequence of a long chain of socio-political evolution starting from the defeat of the social and popular uprising against the memoranda in 2010-2012. The retreat of social struggles and results in the state totalitarianism we live in today. However, I believe that part of this development towards the worst is the political defeat of the “movements” and resistance spaces that refused during the period of the anti-memorandum uprising in 2010-2012 to have a catalytic role and raise the issue of a subversive and revolutionary attempt at the time.
I will have to go back in history to understand what I mean. This retrospective has to do with the history of the Revolutionary Struggle, the context in which it acted, its proposals and the criminal treatment it has had throughout this period until today.
From 2003 to 2017, Revolutionary Struggle —the organization I was part of— was the greatest internal security threat to the regime in Greece, to the State, and to Capital. The history of the organization is placed within a specific historical context of socio-political conditions that were characterized, on the one hand, by the period of the rise of globalization, the dominance of neoliberalism and, at the same time, the existence of the war on “terrorism”, within a period where there was euphoria about the omnipotence of the system, and, on the other hand, by the period of the onset of the global economic crisis from 2008 onwards, which dramatically affected Greece. Within this historical context, the Revolutionary Struggle, after the uprising of December 2008, raised the issue of a revolutionary attempt in Greece in the favorable conditions for it, which were characterized by the debt crisis, bankruptcy, the political crisis of the representative system and the general delegitimization of the political-economic system in the eyes of the social majority due to the policies to address the crisis and the memorandum programs, the imposition of which the Revolutionary Struggle had predicted in 2009 when it had carried out the attack on the Athens Stock Exchange in September 2009. Revolutionary Struggle had already spoken about the risk of national bankruptcy in the event of a global financial crisis when it carried out an attack on the Ministry of Labor in 2005. With the perspective that the crisis presented a unique opportunity, the organization, through its campaign of attacks in 2009 —including armed attacks on riot police (MAT) after the murder of Alexis Grigoropoulos, as well as bombings against Citibank, Eurobank, and the Athens Stock Exchange— proposed to the movement and resistance groups the creation of a revolutionary movement with armed struggle as one of its goals. The aim was to seize the opportunity at the right moment to overthrow the government and the state-capitalist system.
That opportune moment could have been the repeated sieges of Parliament by thousands of people during 2010-2012, where such a mass revolutionary movement could have hypothetically assisted in occupying Parliament and subsequently taking over all centers of political and economic power (ministries, banks, the Bank of Greece, etc.), leading to the collapse of the then-government of George Papandreou, the annulment of Greece’s submission to the IMF, ECB, and EU programs, and paving the way for a revolutionary attempt in Greece for the benefit of the people.
A revolutionary attempt, as Revolutionary Struggle advocated, would have led to the expropriation of capitalist and state property and means of production by the people and the working class, their socialization, and their management by the people themselves —through communities, popular assemblies, and workers’ councils, following the examples of past revolutions, such as the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian Revolution of 1917-1921, and the Spanish Revolution of 1936-1939.
In 2009, Revolutionary Struggle spoke of establishing an Athenian Commune. However, just as the organization was unfolding its campaign to sabotage Greece’s submission to the bailout program, at the most critical moment, comrade Lambros Foundas was killed in a shootout with the police on March 10, 2010, during a preparatory action of the organization (seizing a vehicle) that was to be used in a large-scale attack. His death led to our first arrests on April 10, 2010.
After our arrests, in a Political Letter to Society, we took political responsibility for our participation in Revolutionary Struggle and clarified that Lambros Foundas was a member of the organization, defending his actions and the organization’s struggle. Lambros Foundas was killed to prevent the bailout programs, which Revolutionary Struggle correctly identified as a policy of social genocide and euthanasia of sections of the population.
The governance of Syriza marked the final burial of reformism and the idea of alternative capitalist management. It erased the last illusion that any left-wing party could hold power today without transforming into a neoliberal force. This is why those within movements and resistance spaces who supported Syriza, believing it would resist the creditors, lead Greece out of the Eurozone, and create opportunities for struggle, were at best naive.
Revolutionary Struggle has always maintained —whether active in the field, in prison, or underground— that THE ONLY ANSWER TO THE CRISIS IS SOCIAL REVOLUTION.
This position of the Revolutionary Struggle was based on the analysis that the organization had before the imposition of the 1st memorandum, according to which the dominant role in the global system is played by the markets that have imposed their dictatorship. Thus, alternative avenues for the system in the current form of capitalism, such as the social-democratic (Keynesian) model that prevailed from the end of World War II until the 1980s, have gone bankrupt. So the memoranda were a one-way street for the system and the historical dilemma of the time was a Memorandum or a Revolution.
The Loan Agreements, the well-known memoranda, represent a profound turning point in modern Greek history. They essentially marked the end of the post-dictatorship era, the end of social consent to the capitalist system and representative pseudo-democracy, and the end of the illusion that capitalism brings prosperity. The memoranda are a form of serfdom or slavery for the Greek people, who from now on will live to pay off the overwhelming and unbearable debt, for which they are not responsible, but the political and economic elite of the country. This debt is impossible to repay or drastically reduce. Therefore, the austerity and impoverishment policies—essentially policies of robbery and plundering of the Greek people—will be a permanent and ongoing condition. This proves the lie of the governments about the end of the memoranda. The memoranda are not simply the loans granted by international organizations to the Greek state, which ended in 2018, but a set of conditions and terms that dictate these policies of constant austerity and impoverishment of the Greek people so that the debt can be paid. And as long as the debt exists—which it will forever—these policies will persist, imposing austerity, degrading social infrastructures, compressing labor costs, and selling off public assets that were mortgaged according to the first memorandum agreement of 2010 for the granting of the loans.
Furthermore, the memoranda signified the ongoing crisis and decline of the representative political system, as it no longer matters what the people vote for every four years or which party is in power. The policies implemented by Greek governments, regardless of the party and ideological origin, are dictated by the decision-making centers of the international state-capitalist power bloc: the EU in Brussels, the IMF, the ECB in Frankfurt, NATO, the US, the G7, or the G8.
Greece and the greek state are a colony of the international power system, which imposes a permanent regime of dependence and subjugation. The memoranda are a monstrous social crime, the greatest in modern Greek history. They are responsible for thousands of deaths—murders—due to austerity, impoverishment, lack of healthcare, suicides, while the degradation of social infrastructures is also the cause of massive social crimes—not accidents—such as the Tempe disaster two years ago and the Mati fire in 2018.
And the culprits for the memoranda are the state itself, the executive and legislative branches, all those who voted for it, whose main interest is to pay the debt to the bosses of the transnational elite and enrich themselves. Just as guilty are the country’s own economic elite but also the “independent” judges who declared them “legal” and “constitutional” while they are illegal and unconstitutional that violate all legally guaranteed human rights.
When the Revolutionary Struggle carried out the attack on the Bank of Greece and the IMF in 2014, and comrade Roupa attempted the helicopter hijacking for my escape in 2016 from Korydallos prison, the conditions had changed dramatically. The defeat of the social uprising of 2010-2012, coupled with the loss of the unique opportunity for a revolutionary attempt in the country, is the cause of the social deadlock we face today at every level. After the regime overcame the obstacle of the 2010-2012 uprising, it can now impose any policy with almost no resistance and with relative ease, regardless of which government is in power. This also affects the way criminal repression is carried out and how the Revolutionary Struggle has been treated since 2014, as well as some other political prisoners, but not all. Throughout history, criminal and “correctional” repression is first applied on political prisoners and opponents of the system and then extended to the rest of the criminal prisoners. For example, I was the first prisoner, and in a state of injury and disability, who was transferred to the type C prisons in Domokos in December 2014—established by the Samaras government— and this transfer had been announced as early as July 2014 when I was arrested after the clash in Monastiraki, by the then Minister of Public Order, Kikilias (former Minister of Civil Protection and Climate Change and current Minister of Maritime Affairs and Island Policy).
.I would like to remind you that previously, the 187 law of the Penal Code on “organized crime,” imposed at the request of the UK and the USA, served as the first anti-terrorism law and was applied initially in the trials of post-dictatorship resistance organizations such as 17N and ELA (Επαναστατικός Λαϊκός Αγώνας – Revolutionary People’s Struggle) in 2003-2004, and then became widespread.
Due to our consistent and unwavering stance to defend the action of the Revolutionary Struggle, due to our choice to continue the action of the EA after 2012, after the defeat of the anti-memorandum uprising, due to the danger of the Revolutionary Struggle for systemic stability, as had been admitted by regime actors, both I after my arrest in 2014 and comrade Roupa after her arrest in 2017, We suffered a particularly brutal treatment, whether the government was New Democracy or Syriza. It is no coincidence that the Revolutionary Struggle and its members were bountied twice, once in 2007 when the organization had hit the US embassy with an anti-tank rocket RPG and the State Department offered €1 million. dollars while the Greek state 800,000 euros for our arrest and a second time, in 2014, when the Greek state gave us a bounty by name, me and comrade Roupa, offering 1,000,000 euros. It is no coincidence that since 2015, despite being in prison, I was placed on the State Department’s list of “international terrorists”. Thus, for the attack of the Revolutionary Struggle on the Bank of Greece and the IMF in 2014, both me and comrade Roupa were sentenced to life imprisonment (during the Syriza government), an extreme and disproportionate sentence for an attack that had no fatalities since there was a warning precisely to prevent injuries. Let me point out that in the trial of 2015-’16 in which I was sentenced to life imprisonment for this attack. The comparison between the first trial of the Revolutionary Struggle, which ended in 2013 where we were sentenced to 50 years in prison for 16 actions of the organization, and the life sentence for a single action, for the Bank of Greece-IMF attack in the 2015-2016 and 2017-2018 trials, dramatically demonstrates the change in social and political conditions and balances for the worse after the social defeat of 2012.
However, the worst was the treatment reserved for our 6.5-year-old child in 2017, when comrade Roupa was arrested. It was an unprecedented treatment, one that only fascist and totalitarian regimes have shown in the past. The state treated our child as if he was the “terrorist” himself, who, instead of being handed over to our relatives, was kidnapped by the “anti-terrorist” unit and transferred to the psychiatric department of the Children’s Hospital. At the time, the Juvenile Prosecutor M. E. Nikolu (the same one who, a year earlier, had proposed the acquittal of the main accused in the rape case of the 12-year-old from Kolonos) removed our parental rights, even though she had no jurisdiction. It is well known that the then Minister of “Justice” from SYRIZA publicly defended the inhumane treatment of our child, providing clear political cover for this outrage. In their attempt to deal with us, they even exceeded the limits of the law. Although SYRIZA, during the period it still resisted the Troika in the spring of 2015, abolished type C prisons for clientelist reasons, aiming to absorb parts of the “movement” and the resistance sectors—including some of the anarchists and political prisoners who viewed their rise to power favorably—at the same time, along with the Paraskevopoulos law, they passed a provision that imposed consecutive sentences for prisoners who committed acts of violence within prison, which would not be merged with the main sentence, as had been the case until then. This resulted in longer prison sentences. Later, when SYRIZA made a major shift and capitulated to the demands of the creditors after passing the third memorandum, they planned to pass a “penal” code that would, among other things, provide isolation wings for “disobedient” or “dangerous” prisoners or those who attempted or succeeded in escape, similar to the high-security prisons legislated by the Mitsotakis government in 2022. Indeed, when comrade Roupa and I went on a hunger strike in November-December 2017 with demands to not limit our visits with our child (so we could see them four times a year) and for me to be released from illegal solitary confinement for five months, following an incident in court when a former member of our organization openly separated from us and made statements of repentance, we also demanded the withdrawal of the provision for isolation wings in the bill that was under consideration but was ultimately not passed. However, before Syriza left power, they legislated a section on July 11, 2019 (with Minister M. Kalogirou) that stated that multiple-life prisoners would have the right to apply for conditional release after 25 years instead of 19, as was stipulated in the old penal code. This is now being applied retroactively by the Mitsotakis government in Domokos prison, even though, according to the law, for older prisoners, the more favorable provisions of the previous penal code should apply. The pilot implementation of this provision was first applied to comrade D. Koufodinas and later to other multiple-life prisoners in Domokos prison.
The difference between the last SYRIZA and ND governments regarding criminal repression is that while SYRIZA followed a more selective approach to repression, ND follows a more sweeping repressive policy against everyone. The period of SYRIZA’s “left-wing interlude,” which made the expected turn to comply with the demands of the Troika, paved the way for the bulldozer of the ND government from 2019 onwards. It is a link in the chain of the socio-political evolutionary path from 2010-2012 to today, as I mentioned at the beginning of the text. The ND government from 2019 onwards has revised the criminal and “penal” code more times than any other government in the past. The first revision of the penal code was the first thing they did during their term, as early as August 2019.
Apart from the ongoing policy of surpluses, which arise from the continued plundering of the people to pay the enormous debt, at the repressive level, they immediately implemented an aggressive policy based on the doctrine of “law and order.” Thus, they evacuated most of the squats in the anarchist/anti-authoritarian space and the refugee and migrant squats, legislated restrictions on demonstrations, and reduced the right to strike. During the same period, in the fall of 2019, Kikilias made a statement that Maziotis would be able to be released in two years, a statement that seems more like a warning/advice to the judiciary, since indeed in January 2022, I had completed 3/5 of the sentence required for conditional release according to the old penal code.
The defeat of 2010-2012 also paved the way for the unprecedented totalitarian measures (e.g., total lockdown) applied during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Measures that led to a zombie society, which did not aim at citizens’ health but at the management of the health system, which was impossible to handle due to the governments’ previous undermining and destruction of it—an ongoing process due to the austerity policies. Regarding the revision of the criminal and “penal” codes, this was primarily aimed at targeting political prisoners who had remained in prison since the summer of 2019 and later, as well as prolonging the stay of prisoners in prison.
Thus, the maximum limit of temporary imprisonment sentences increased from 15 years (as defined in the 2019 penal code) to 20 years. In cases of multiple cumulative sentences, the maximum limit rose to 25 years instead of 20. The conditions for parole have become stricter, as the required time served for most temporary imprisonment cases increased from 3/5 to 4/5 of the sentence, while for a single life sentence, the threshold rose from 16 to 20 years. In the “correctional” code, the limits for granting prison leaves have also been extended. In most cases of temporary imprisonment, the previous threshold of 1/5 was abolished, and now the required time served has nearly reached the parole threshold, making the right to prison leave almost extinct. For a single life sentence, the threshold for granting leave increased from 8 to 12 years, while for multiple life sentences, the limit is extended by three years for each additional life sentence, with a maximum cap of 22 years. Now, not only is the right to prison leave practically abolished, but parole itself is granted in minimal cases. In fact, disciplinary infractions from the distant past, even those that should no longer be considered per the law, are still being used as a reason for denial. Additionally, prisoners convicted under Article 187A—essentially political prisoners—have been excluded from serving their sentences in agricultural prisons, as well as certain categories of convicts serving life sentences under Article 187 (criminal organization). The purpose of this measure is to prolong incarceration since the work credit system in agricultural prisons allows for a greater reduction in actual sentence time compared to high-security prisons. Finally, Type C prisons have been reintroduced as high-security facilities, where, among others, prisoners convicted under Article 187A—i.e., political prisoners—will be held. Another crucial amendment, in direct contrast to previous legal practice, states that parole is no longer solely based on a prisoner’s behavior while incarcerated. Instead, it also depends on the state’s perception of the “moral reprehensibility” of the crimes committed and whether the prisoner acknowledges the supposed gravity of their actions.
This provision was already applied in my case by the previous Council of Misdemeanor Judges of Lamia, which denied my parole request. The decision cited, among other things, my refusal to renounce my actions as one of the reasons for rejection—clear evidence that the ruling was politically motivated.
Thus, ruling 175/2024 of the Lamia Council of Misdemeanor Judges states in its reasoning: “…In this regard, the character traits of the defendant are taken into account, as they were demonstrated during their remote personal appearance before the present council via technological means. During this appearance, the defendant exhibited complete disregard for the justice system and the prison facility where he is serving his sentence. These positions have been consistent, and the defendant has not abandoned them… by persistently refusing to acknowledge the criminal nature of the acts for which he was convicted, emphasizing that he does not recognize them as violations of social harmony or criminal offenses… This stance, in any case, indicates the defendant’s personality structure, of which delinquency is a fundamental component, as evidenced by their refusal to exhibit the appropriate remorseful behavior. It is also indicative of his lack of moral rehabilitation, which is the intended purpose of the sentence imposed and served, despite its long duration, and which the defendant has explicitly stated he has no intention of demonstrating.”
Within this context of escalating state and regime-driven authoritarianism—an outcome of the defeat of the 2010-2012 social and popular uprising against the austerity memoranda— and in conjunction with the tightening of criminal repression, it becomes clear why my parole request has been denied seven times over the past three years, despite the fact that I have been granted 17 temporary prison leaves. The same logic explains why, when comrade Roupa was released under restrictive conditions in November 2023, the Deputy Prosecutor of Appeals in Chalkida immediately filed an appeal against her release. Two court rulings were issued within a year to decide whether she would remain free or return to prison. It is now certain that I will pay the full price for the history of Revolutionary Struggle—a crucial chapter in contemporary social and class struggles, as well as modern Greek history—until the very last day of my sentence.
The armed revolutionary struggle, according to our perception, must go hand in hand with social and political correlations and conditions, with the wider social environment, while there is also a dialectical relationship and interaction with the rest of the “movement” and the spaces of resistance that feed it.
The blows that the Revolutionary Struggle received in both 2010 and 2014-’17 were parallel blows to society itself, social resistance and the “movement” from which we come.
The failure of the organization to escalate its action again, at the time of the memorandums, from 2012 onwards, was the result of the defeat of the social anti-memorandum uprising of 2010-2012 and the retreat of social struggles and resistance in the immediate aftermath, and on the other hand of the retreat of the “movement” and the spaces of resistance whose sections saw “opportunities for struggle” during the Syriza government in 2015-’19. The result of the retreat of the “movement” was, to some extent, the lack of solidarity we faced, which in turn fed the brutal criminal treatment we had on the part of the state. But the Revolutionary Struggle was never defeated politically. Because defeat is not exclusively a “military” defeat but first and foremost political defeat. And political defeat is not the killing of someone on the struggle like comrade Lambros Fountas, nor the long-term imprisonment, as long as he remains consistent in his struggle, his action and his choices. Political defeat is the revision and repentance, the discrediting of revolutionary action, the separation of one of his comrades in front of the court in order to save or lighten his position, a stance supported by parts of the “movement” in a court of the Revolutionary Struggle, something that is a world first in the history of movements and armed revolutionary organizations. The Revolutionary Struggle may have ceased to act as some within the “movement” wanted – from 2012 onwards– but it was never defeated politically. Because his analyses and predictions have been vindicated over time. Because his proposals for another society, without state and capital and without classes, remain relevant.
PS: The fact that after many years after February 12, 2012, millions of people in Greece took to the streets against the state crime of Tempi – a result of the degradation of the social infrastructure of all the Memorandum governments (G. Papandreou, Papademos, Samaras, Tsipras, Mitsotakis) –is a hopeful message. However, the complete overthrow of the current state and regime totalitarianism remains a… revolutionary cause.
Nikos Maziotis,
convicted for the Revolutionary Struggle
4th wing Domokos prison
* Nikos Maziotis: Revolutionaries are not «corrected» nor «morally improved»