Modern conflict rarely involves a straightforward invasion. The conflict in Sudan is a neo-colonial takeover, with the UAE and Egypt using local militias as stand-ins to exploit a nation for its resources and strategic position.
The ongoing conflict in Sudan is a catastrophic manifestation of decades of fascist rule and intense regional imperial aspirations. Sudan’s internal struggles have been weaponized by external actors, transforming the nation into a theater for neo-colonial interests. In the war that started on April 15 2023, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other countries are implementing a larger plan to take control of Africa’s security and resources on the behalf of the U.S. empire.
Fragmentation and Foreign Involvement
The roots of the current crisis trace back to the era of President Omar al-Bashir, who feared he might become the next Saddam Hussein or suffer the fate of the Taliban after 9/11 with Sudan being on the U.S. regime change list. Earlier, Sudan had lost a unifying figure in Dr. John Garang—who can be thought of as Sudan’s JFK—who mysteriously died while pushing for national unity. Following his death and subsequent conflicts, neoconservatives eventually settled on South Sudan’s creation as a vassal state, a move that also led to catastrophic consequences after South Sudanese leaders refused to comply with US policy.
The 2011 “Arab Spring” brought a second scare to the Bashir regime. Demonstrating Sudan’s capacity for regional involvement, Bashir assisted Qatar in its regime change plot against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, with reports indicating that the forces that entered Tripoli used weapons that were “one hundred percent Sudanese-made”. This move by Bashir signaled to the regional US allies that Sudan is open for business as a collaborator in regime changes and imperial policy, with past destabilization efforts from Bashir’s government in Libya, Chad, and Uganda. These efforts would lay the groundwork for an eventual regional alignment with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that the UAE would take advantage of.
Empowering a Nation-Within-a-Nation
Leading up to Bashir’s eventual overthrow in 2019, foreign policies inadvertently or deliberately empowered the RSF, allowing them to become a nation-within-a-nation. The European Union’s “Khartoum Process,” in 2014 aimed at stemming African migration, empowered the RSF to quell migration, granting the paramilitary group legitimacy and resources through the central government in Khartoum.
In 2015 Saudi Arabia and the UAE began to militarize marginalized Sudanese citizens, utilizing them to fight in the Yemen war. With senior Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) officers coordinating the ground operations in Yemen, the majority of fighters came from the RSF. The Yemen war marked the solidification of relations between the RSF and the UAE, as the money provided enabled the RSF to intensify its recruitment campaign, which transformed it from a fighting unit under SAF to a parallel force to the national army.
This external support was compounded by Russia’s support of the RSF via the now-disbanded Wagner group, further solidifying the militia’s power base. In 2017 Bashir strengthened his ties with Russia, which then prompted the now-disbanded Wagner group to create security and gold mining partnerships with the RSF. This opened a new source of income for the RSF as they controlled vast gold mines in North Darfur, as well as mines in South Darfur and East Darfur, bordering Central African Republic and South Sudan respectively.
The Transitional Struggle and Intensified Pressure
Following Bashir’s toppling, Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, a former high-ranking UN official, became the prime minister, but his transitional government was quickly faced with severe internal and external conflicts. On the military side, SAF was headed by Abdel-Fatah Al-Burhan, a senior Bashir-era army officer who was in charge of military operations in Darfur, and was appointed as the head of the Transitional Military Council (TMC). The RSF was led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, nicknamed “Himmedti,” and was appointed as the deputy head of the TMC.
As the RSF, SAF, and various political forces sought foreign backers, the United States intensified pressure on the transitional government. The US pressured Sudan to sign the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel in 2020, positioning the nation to officially become the backyard of the “New Middle East,” a term later coined by Netanyahu in 2023. Additionally, the US demanded that Sudan pay hundreds of millions in compensation for terrorism attacks and continued to pressure the government to implement harsh austerity measures and lift essential subsidies. This pressure was seen as wins for both the Trump and Biden administrations, however it also created discontent in the street, and gave the Bashir regime loyalists a reason to ride the anti-US wave and plot against the civilian government.
This period also saw fierce competition among regional powers attempting to secure ports along the Red Sea. Turkey, the UAE, and Russia have all attempted to strike deals with the government to secure these ports and gain influence in the crucial Red Sea trade corridor. As the pressure of competition intensified, foreign actors solidified their control over the two major military factions.
Egypt, driven by motivations including border security, the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and Nile water access, and the pursuit of regional hegemony, solidified its control over the SAF through support and political coercion. Egypt supposedly even pushed Al-Burhan to covertly support the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in its war on Addis Ababa, where at the height of the war in Ethiopia Burhan suddenly mobilized the army to take back the disputed Fashaga area that borders Ethiopia. The timing of the mobilization was odd given that the region has been disputed for decades, and it just so happened to border the TPLF-controlled areas.
The UAE on the other hand, has not only propped up the RSF, but it practiced neocolonial policy in Sudan across many sectors of Sudanese life. UAE’s “subimperialism,” as described by writer Hussam Mahjoub, involved expanding its cooperation with the RSF by supplying arms, securing gold mines, and trade in livestock and agriculture. Adding to its increasing footprint in the continent, the RSF became the UAE’s main actor in Africa, while expanding its influence to Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and maintaining a strong relationship with the Libyan warlord, Khalif Haftar. However, the UAE hasn’t been working alone, as they were the first signatories to the Abraham Accords, and have created a tight bond with Israel. This normalization gave the UAE green light to play an increasingly neocolonial role in Africa with a green light from the US. The pattern of UAE involvement in Africa signifies a sort of outsourcing of US empire ambitions to regional actors who were not in the picture as recently as 15 years ago. The map below, showing the flow of arms from the UAE, illustrates how this emboldened the RSF during the 2023 war but making sure it had allies across the border that worked under the directive of the UAE.
The 2023 War
The path to the 2023 war was set in October 2021 when both Burhan and military leader Himmedti overthrew the civilian government of Dr. Hamdok. Efforts in 2022 to avoid a conflict included a framework agreement proposed by political forces that would have restructured the military. While the exact provocation is still debated, it is suspected that former Bashir loyalists in the SAF initiated the conflict, though the RSF was ready and willing to fight due to their strong foreign backing.
When the war began, the primary regional alliances became clear: Egypt firmly backed the SAF, while the UAE backed the RSF. Second-tier support for the SAF included Turkey, Eritrea, and Iran, while the RSF received second-tier support from Chad and Kenya as conduits for arms. As the war intensified, each side of the war started garnering support from different actors, including Somalia, South Sudan, and Libya. As the violence spread and millions became displaced the effects of the war spread to these countries. South Sudan’s economy collapsed due to the halting of oil pipelines that go through Sudan.
As millions were displaced, and over 20 million are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, foreign actors started to intervene In efforts to mediate. The BRICS countries attempted to quell the regional conflicts in 2023, partly by adding adversaries like Egypt and Ethiopia (along with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) to the alliance. BRICS supposedly negotiated the evacuation of Burhan from the military headquarters in August 2023, which was under siege by the RSF. The assumption was that Burhan would leave the military headquarters in Khartoum and join the negotiations in Jeddah. However, Burhan saw this as an opportunity to regroup the SAF forces and their allies, and seek to gain regional and international legitimacy for the fight against the RSF.
Other efforts include the US leading the “Quad” (US, Egypt, UAE, Saudi) in attempts to pressure the SAF and RSF to negotiate. Ultimately, the African Union is poised to facilitate an inclusive political dialogue once a ceasefire is achieved.
The Sudanese war serves as a tragic analogy: the nation has become a high-value commodity caught in a global auction, where the SAF and RSF are merely the proxies bidding with foreign-supplied arms, rather than independent political actors fighting for national interests.
Mosaab Baba is a founding member of the Pan-African Forum – Sudan, and previously a member of the Girifna movement in Sudan. In recent years Mosaab has been a lead consultant for the Ayin Network, as well as working with the new civic actors after the 2019 revolution.
source: Black Agenda Report