Before Hamas, there was Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The resistance movement, founded in 1981, organized itself around the principle that defeat of Israeli occupation and subjugation could only be achieved through armed struggle, and it sought to merge the secular and Islamist strands of the Palestinian political landscape. For 30 years, PIJ has engaged in a campaign of paramilitary warfare against Israel and has controlled the second largest armed Palestinian resistance faction. While Hamas has governed the Gaza Strip since 2006, PIJ has often set the tone for increased militancy toward Israel and has proven its willingness to engage in battles on its own.

Though PIJ says it did not know about the October 7 attacks ahead of time, its armed wing joined the Hamas-led operation that morning, took hostages of its own, and—together with Hamas’s Al-Qassam Brigades—has waged a nine-month guerrilla war in Gaza against Israeli occupation forces.

Senior leaders of PIJ rarely grant interviews to Western journalists, but Dr. Mohammed Al-Hindi, the group’s second highest-ranking official, agreed to sit down for a wide-ranging, in-person interview with Drop Site News. Al-Hindi discussed PIJ’s role in the October 7 attacks, what he sees as the political aims of the operations, his perspective on President Joe Biden’s push to revive a “two-state” solution, Donald Trump and the U.S. elections, the Abraham Accords, and the future of Palestinian liberation and politics. He also discusses PIJ’s ties to Iran and explains why he believes Israel would face a catastrophe in Lebanon if it decided to go to war against Hezbollah.

Since the early 1980s, Al-Hindi has been a central figure in Palestinian Islamic Jihad and currently serves as its deputy secretary general and chief political negotiator. He is a pediatrician by training and early in his career worked at Al-Shifa hospital in Gaza. Al-Hindi was jailed for a year during the First Intifada and has been imprisoned several times by both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. In 2004, Israeli helicopters fired several missiles at Al-Hindi’s office in Gaza in what was widely believed to be an assassination attempt. Al-Hindi is the chief of PIJ’s political department and the top deputy to its secretary general, Ziyad Al-Nakhalah. He led PIJ’s negotiations with Israel that achieved a ceasefire in May 2023 and continues to advise Hamas negotiators in the current war. In 2019, Al-Hindi was named a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the U.S. State Department.

Drop Site News has decided to publish the interview with Al-Hindi in full because we believe it is in the public interest to examine the perspectives of a top figure in the current Palestinian armed resistance and the second in command of an organization at the center of Israel’s genocidal war against the Palestinians of Gaza.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad: The Backstory

“In the 1980s, when a young guard of Palestinian students wanted the Muslim Brotherhood to engage in armed violence or in armed struggle against Israeli occupation, they were dissatisfied with the Muslim Brotherhood’s lack of interest in armed struggle,” said Erik Skare, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oslo who is widely viewed as one of the leading English-language scholars on PIJ. “If you were a Palestinian in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip who wanted to participate in the armed struggle, there was no feasible vehicle to do so. On the one hand, you had the Islamist movement that did not partake in the military armed struggle. And on the other hand, you had the secular nationalists who were either in jail, [or] who were incapacitated.” PIJ filled this void.

Skare has written two books on the group, including A History of Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Faith, Revolution and Awareness in the Middle East. He said PIJ’s founders rejected what they saw as the dogmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas rose. “They did not just read Ibn Taymiyya. They didn’t just read Sayyid Qutb. They didn’t just read Hassan al-Banna. They read Lenin, they read Jean-Paul Sartre, they read Fyodor Dostoevsky. They read everything that they could come across as they tried to figure out the future and the way forward and out of that Palestinian impasse,” Skare told me. “They wanted to be true to their religion and go to the cinema. They wanted to read, study Islamist orthodoxy, while being open to new ideas.”

In August 1987, members of PIJ ambushed and killed an Israeli army officer in the Gaza Strip, in what would become a precursor to a broader Palestinian revolt. During the First Intifada, which began in December, the PIJ expanded its armed operations in Gaza and the West Bank, initially utilizing stones, knives, and small arms. By the end of the decade, the group’s senior leadership was exiled and many of its members jailed. In 1992, Israel deported hundreds of PIJ and Hamas members, including influential leaders of both movements, to Lebanon. In exile, the two groups forged closer ties and discussed coordinating actions against Israel. PIJ also deepened its relationship with Hezbollah, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Syrian government. Its members received military training and support from all three.

PIJ rose to international recognition and infamy in the 1990s as both it and Hamas began to conduct suicide bombings against Israeli civilians and military targets. PIJ also began to formally organize its paramilitary wing, Saraya Al-Quds, the Jerusalem Brigades. On January 22, 1995, a PIJ operative disguised as an Israeli soldier approached a crowded bus stop in the central Israeli town of Beit Lid where Israeli soldiers were awaiting transport back to their bases. The operative detonated an explosive belt in the middle of the crowd. A few minutes later, a second suicide bomber attacked. In all, 21 Israeli soldiers and one civilian were killed. “We confirm our ability to penetrate all the enemy’s false security lines and reach the heart of the enemy,” a top PIJ leader said in claiming responsibility for the attack. President Bill Clinton responded the next day by issuing an executive order criminalizing any financial support for PIJ.

In 1997, both PIJ and Hamas were officially designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department. During the Second Intifada, which began in September 2000 and lasted for nearly five years, both organizations engaged in military battles against Israeli forces and conducted extensive suicide bombings inside Israel.

In the years since the last intifada, PIJ has cultivated its presence in both the West Bank and Gaza, from which it has regularly engaged in rocket attacks against Israeli military targets and cities. Unlike Hamas, PIJ is not a political party that fields candidates for elections run by the Palestinian Authority, as it rejects the entire framework of the Oslo Accords that gave rise to the PA. Instead, PIJ has prioritized confronting Israeli settler colonialism and occupation through direct military action. “They fight for the entirety of historical Palestine from the river to the sea,” said Skare. “The logic is pretty much the same as the PLO in the 1960s and 1970s—that what has been taken with force has to be regained by force.”

While PIJ is often narrowly portrayed as a violent Islamic terror organization, it views itself both as an armed vanguard advocating a unified liberation movement and a political and social movement rooted in Islamist and Palestinian history and culture. “We saw two categories of Palestinian: the nationalists, who talked about liberating Palestine but who forgot about Islam, and the traditionalists, who talked about Islam and an Islamic state but who forgot about Palestine,” observed PIJ’s founder Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi in an interview in 1995, nine months before he was assassinated by the Mossad in front of a Malta hotel. “We had to solve this problematic issue, to make the crossing-point between nationalist and Islamist.”

Many of PIJ’s earliest recruits were drawn from the ranks of the secular PLO, and PIJ’s leaders forged a path to uniting that secular revolutionary spirit with Islamist ideas. Its central objective was to reclaim all territory seized during the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and to avenge the violent displacement and killing of Palestinians during the Nakba. “Islamic Jihad turned the logic of the Muslim Brotherhood upside down,” said Skare. “The Muslim Brotherhood focused on Islamization for liberation. That is, you had to Islamize Palestinian society first and prepare the Palestinian masses by spreading Islamic values so could you prepare them for the armed struggle to liberate Palestine. But Islamic Jihad, on the other hand, they said first we have to liberate the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and only then can we focus on Islamization.”

Skare said that despite its designation by the U.S. and other Western nations as a terrorist organization, PIJ does not conduct attacks outside of historic Palestine. “It also distances itself from attacks against the West and also against Israelis outside of Israeli or Palestinian territory because it would weaken the Palestinian struggle and the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle,” Skare said. “They make it quite clear that their struggle is not against Israelis because of their Jewish faith, but because of the occupation.”

Since Hamas’s founding in 1987, its relations with PIJ have seen periods of tight coordination as well as conflict, strategic disagreement, and turf wars. After Hamas won the democratic elections in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2006 and consolidated its control of the Gaza Strip, the two groups often synchronized their operations against Israel. The year it took power in Gaza, Hamas announced an end to the use of suicide bombings against Israel, causing the number of such attacks to plummet. Hamas said the tactic had only been deployed during an “exceptional period.”

While Hamas became a governing authority, responsible for the basic administration of civil life on the Gaza Strip, PIJ eluded these functions and squarely focused on armed resistance. PIJ opened its doors to Palestinians who prioritized armed action against Israel, including those “that were dissatisfied with the governance project of Hamas,” said Skare, who has interviewed senior PIJ figures. “It says something about the way [PIJ] can push other armed movements.”

PIJ and Hamas formed a united front in a series of shorter duration wars in the years following Hamas’s election, including in 2009, 2012, and 2014. In 2018, the two groups revived a joint operations center with other smaller armed factions in Gaza. In May 2021, PIJ and Hamas launched a barrage of rockets at Israel in response to Israeli attacks on Palestinian worshippers at Al-Aqsa mosque and threats of evictions in East Jerusalem, killing 12 Israeli civilians. Israel launched an intense 11-day bombing campaign against Gaza, during which more than 250 Palestinians were killed and some 1,900 injured. The war ended when President Joe Biden called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and told him the runway was finished. Both Hamas and PIJ leaders made clear that while a truce was reached, the broader war would endure. “We will come to you, God willing, in a roaring flood,” Hamas’s Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar declared in a speech in December 2022. “We will come to you with endless rockets, we will come to you in a limitless flood of soldiers, we will come to you with millions of our people, like the repeating tide.”

While Hamas generally respected the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire with Israel, PIJ and Israel continued to fight. In August 2022, Israel began a campaign of targeted assassinations against senior PIJ leaders in Gaza, killing important commanders. Israel said the attacks were “preemptive” strikes. Two of the Israeli airstrikes killed dozens of Palestinians, including children. In retaliation, PIJ launched more than 1,000 rockets into Israeli territory as Israel pummeled Gaza with further air raids. Israel also swept PIJ strongholds in the West Bank, arresting PIJ operatives.

The intermittent battles between Israel and PIJ lasted until May 13, 2023, when an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire was declared. While Hamas was not a party to the fighting, it praised PIJ for “defending the Palestinian people against the most recent Israeli aggression against the Gaza Strip.”

Prior to October 7, Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s Al-Quds force was estimated, in Western government and media sources, to have between one and eight thousand fighters in Gaza. Sources within PIJ, however, say the number of fighters and logistical support personnel exceeded 10,000 (reliable, verifiable statistics do not exist). While it is a smaller force than Hamas’s Qassam Brigades, which prior to October 7 was estimated in the range of 20,000–30,000 soldiers, PIJ also enjoys a stronger paramilitary presence in the West Bank, particularly in Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jenin. PIJ recently said that it has continued to enlist new recruits to fight Israel in both Gaza and the West Bank.

In reporting on the October 7 attacks against Israel, PIJ is often unmentioned or described in passing as another militant group that participated in Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. By the group’s own account, it was not involved with the planning of the October 7 attacks but joined in immediately that morning when the operations began. Skare said that while PIJ may not have organized the attacks, its militant posture of armed struggle as the only solution against Israel may have played a role in Hamas’s decision to contemplate the large-scale, decisive action. “Hamas had to balance on a knife’s edge between being a provider of services, a provider of governance in the Gaza Strip, and maintaining its [role] as a resistance movement. Islamic Jihad could continue stressing the need for armed resistance, continue stressing the need for a complete liberation without being encumbered by the inconvenient responsibilities of governance. And that always was troublesome for Hamas,” he said. “I think the fact that Hamas carried out October 7 was partly caused by the fact that Hamas found itself in an impossible situation.”

Along with Hamas, PIJ’s standing among Palestinians in the occupied territories has risen significantly since October. Its members have fought alongside Qassam forces in the guerrilla war against Israel’s occupation forces in Gaza, and it regularly posts videos of its forces ambushing Israeli tanks and soldiers.

PIJ continues to hold an unknown number of Israelis taken on October 7—PIJ initially said it had 30 captives—and participated in the exchanges last November during which 105 Israelis were freed in exchange for hundreds of Palestinians held by Israel. Along with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a member of the Axis of Resistance, a coalition that includes Iran, Syria, Ansar Allah in Yemen, and several regional militant groups that coordinate strategy in confronting Israel.

My Interview With Mohammed Al-Hindi

Mohammed Al-Hindi: In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. First of all, Islamic Jihad is generally perceived as a fighting group. That impression, however, is not accurate. In the early stages of its establishment, our movement tried to develop its own vision and understanding before engaging in active fighting against Israel. A vision of the political reality, understanding the Islamic world, and the region’s history. So, it started as an intellectual discussion before it took up arms. Ultimately, however, its analysis was that the project of establishing Israel was a Western one. The West had its issues with the Jews. In short, it could be said that antisemitism is a European problem that did not exist in the East. It was solved, however, at the expense of the Palestinian people and the region. The Zionist project is not about the Jews in the first place. Rather, it is a Western colonization project that aims to control the region and preclude its independence and development.

This is the Zionist project at heart. We do not have any problem with the Jews per se. Rather, our problem is with Zionism as a racist movement which was based on usurping our resources and homeland and displacing us in 1948. This was the founding political vision upon which Islamic Jihad movement was established. Our vision relied on Islam which constitutes the culture, history and faith of the Palestinian people.

Based on that vision and that understanding of the political reality and Islamic history, the movement was established. This debate started at an early stage when we were students in Egyptian universities in the mid-1970s. This vision was translated, though, when we returned to the Gaza Strip under the occupation. Since there was occupation, it was imperative to have resistance. So, the Islamic Jihad started to engage in resistance in the early 1980s after we returned from Egyptian universities.

So, the resistance emerged based on the presence of the occupation. As a religious, Muslim people, we base our resistance on our understanding, history and faith. That’s why some identified Islamic Jihad as standing somewhat in the middle between Islamic extremism and the national movement, which was based at the time on Fatah and the Palestinian left. In brief, we are a national Palestinian resistance movement which is rooted in our people’s faith, culture and belief, namely Islam.

Jeremy Scahill: When you say that Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a national resistance movement you’re talking about armed struggle.

Mohammed Al-Hindi: No, I’m talking about the idea of Islamic Jihad.

Jeremy Scahill: How do you define then what a resistance group is in the context of what you’ve said?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: As long as there is occupation, there must be resistance. We started our resistance in the presence of occupation through the Nakba in 1948 and then in 1967 with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. We were conceived in the Gaza Strip and the movement then expanded to the West Bank under the occupation. The occupation was engaging in practices which all the world could see. But they were silent, unfortunately, because ultimately the Zionist project is a Western one. That’s why in 1987, in the First Intifada, under then-Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, they used an extremely oppressive policy which was the ‘bone breaking’ policy against children involved in the uprising. Quite literally, a soldier would hold a child’s hand against a rock and then break it with another rock. It was implemented literally. So this violence used by Israel under which we grew up, made it necessary to resist.

Jeremy Scahill: But Palestinian Islamic Jihad, for instance, does not run for elections.

Mohammed Al-Hindi: That’s not true. We do take part in student elections in Palestinian Universities. We take part in elections of syndicates, all Palestinian syndicates: doctors, teachers, lawyers, engineers. All syndicates. Around 13 syndicates. And we have taken the initiative in forming some other syndicates too. This impression or perception, though, was because we did not take part in the 2006 Palestinian legislative council elections. Refraining from participation constitutes a form of participation itself, a form of political position. We have taken a position towards the Oslo Accord, which at the national level has conceded some basic principles in addition to its being undemocratic as the Palestinian people have not been consulted, nor were other members of the PLO and its factions. This agreement was reached behind the back of the Palestinian people. So the position of the Islamic Jihad was to boycott any arrangements or elections of an authority emanating from this agreement. This is a political position of its own right. We take part in all other elections.

Jeremy Scahill: What is the relationship between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: First, in terms of the founding principles, Islam constitutes the faith, culture and history of our Palestinian people. It is a faith for Muslims and a culture for Christians. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad use the faith of our people and their culture in the case of Christians as a point of departure. We further agree with Hamas on some aspects of our political vision in terms of the position vis-à-vis the Oslo Accord and rejecting it and in relation to the resistance imperative and maintenance of Palestinian basic principles. On the other hand, there are disagreements in relation to our vision or some political issues such as elections. We had a position, Hamas had a different position, and so on. So in some political issues, Islamic Jihad holds a different position from Hamas. Our differences were more pronounced in the past. With time, however, the scope of disagreement between the two movements started to diminish.

Jeremy Scahill: I want to ask you about the two-year period leading up to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. You had the 2021 Israeli bombing campaign against Gaza. And then over the course of the two years that followed, the Israelis continued to target and assassinate leaders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Maybe we could begin by describing this period and how your movement experienced Israel’s attacks from the end of 2021’s intense war until October 7, 2023. Also, Palestinian Islamic Jihad was launching rocket attacks against Israel and Hamas was largely staying out of it or at least saying that they were not directly participating. They were not condemning Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but they were saying that they weren’t participating in it.

Mohammed Al-Hindi: First of all, Israel is under the illusion that eliminating military or political leaders of Palestinian resistance movements would affect these movements. In the two years you pointed out, Islamic Jihad was exposed to a wave of assassinations, actually three waves. So Islamic Jihad engaged in defending the Palestinian people and responding to those crimes committed against leaders in the military structure Al-Quds Brigades. Hamas, during those three confrontations, did not intervene. But as you said it did not condemn the Palestinian resistance and launching rockets. As a matter of fact, it stood by the Islamic Jihad in its political position stating this was a normal response to the Zionist crimes. Some, especially in Israel and some regional media outlets tried to disgrace Hamas for having abandoned the Islamic Jihad, saying it could have helped fend off the Zionist aggression on Gaza since it was in charge of its administration. But let me clarify that Islamic Jihad was capable of responding and persisting in confronting Israel for a long time without intervention. If it were not capable, we might have blamed Hamas for not taking part, but Islamic Jihad proved to be capable and Israel was forced to engage in negotiations with the Islamic Jihad movement in Cairo. I was leading these negotiations with the Egyptians. We reached an agreement. Those observing may not use this episode to drive a wedge between Hamas and Islamic Jihad. On the contrary, Islamic Jihad understood Hamas’s position and decided we can manage this battle on our own in the three confrontations and we managed quite well.

The October 7 Attacks

Mohammed Al-Hindi: Hamas, or more accurately, Al-Qassam, were getting prepared for Al-Aqsa Flood and no one knew about it. A day earlier, on October 6, we in Islamic Jihad had a celebration of the anniversary of the Islamic Jihad movement. Thousands took part in the celebration and we were taken by surprise like everybody else. However, very shortly after learning about the Flood, we engaged in this battle. It was our duty as a resistance movement to confront the aggression immediately.

Jeremy Scahill: Just to clarify: You’re saying that Palestinian Islamic Jihad, even its special forces, were not at all involved with the planning of it until the morning of the knocking down of the fences, the walls?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: Right.

Jeremy Scahill: So once your forces started entering the battle space, were you surprised at how deep into Israeli areas of control they were able to get, particularly on the military bases?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: The whole world was surprised! The Israeli military units just evaporated.

Jeremy Scahill: Once the operations were under way, were the military commanders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad able to give orders to their men in the field? Given that they didn’t participate in the planning, once your soldiers were in battle did Islamic Jihad issue guidelines for them or objectives? How were the orders given then to the PIJ forces that participated?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: At the beginning, the [Al-Quds] military commanders of our movement started to give orders to engage. So after a short while, the Islamic Jihad’s Quds Brigades took part in the battle and the confrontations started. As a resistance movement, our duty was to fight against occupation and against this aggression. Whenever a battle erupts, Al-Quds Brigades take up their role and engage.

Jeremy Scahill: When you started watching the initial media reports—some of the first reports said two thousand people, mostly civilians, were killed, though those numbers were later reduced and it became clear a large number of Israeli soldiers were also killed along with civilians—what sort of response did you expect from the Israeli state to these operations?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: We know Israel was built on lying and this was one more lie. We recognized from the beginning that there was a great deal of misleading information addressed to the West. We expected, of course, that there would be a strong response. However, over time, these lies started to be exposed. The Israeli response to October 7 was not governed by any sort of laws. Neither military laws nor laws of occupation nor any sort of laws. I believe with time, more crimes that no one knows about until now will be exposed. Especially in relation to detainees who were arrested just outside Gaza and many of whom were executed in the field.

Jeremy Scahill: What do you understand as the direct objectives of the October 7 operations?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: First, this is another episode of this conflict. It has erupted like that, but it is another episode of a long, bitter, and bloody conflict since 1948. By 1948, we refer to the Nakba where enormous crimes were committed. Around 500 Palestinian villages were destroyed. The Palestinian people have been fighting since 1948. You might know, or not, that there is no Palestinian family that does not have at least one martyr. All the fake news that Israel fabricates to mislead the Western world is obvious, but the West accepts and wants it because they want to keep Israel as a control and hegemony project in the region. What happened on October 7 was an extension of those crimes. It is also proof that the Palestinian people cannot be destroyed. In short, Israel and the United States wanted to completely end the Palestinian cause, not only in Gaza but everywhere.

Things started to become clearer after the Abraham Accords, which overlooked the rights of the Palestinian people and aimed to arrange the region along security terms by building security and economic alliances in the region away from the rights of the Palestinian people. Obviously, the Palestinian people are not dead and it was expected they would defend themselves and their rights. Unless they receive their rights in full, there would be nothing but more blood in the region. It is against that context that we understand Al-Aqsa Flood: not in the context of October 7, rather in the context of 1948.

Jeremy Scahill: Do you have a sense as to why this specific day was chosen for those operations?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: This is an issue that was at the discretion of Al-Qassam. But I could say that Gaza has been under blockade for 17 years. There are crimes being committed in the West Bank and Gaza. There is a regional political setting in which a new enemy is being invented for the region away from the Zionist enemy. This is the context in which we understand this. So a fighting group makes its arrangements and takes its decision and makes the judgment on the appropriate conditions. Undoubtedly, the conditions were indeed appropriate.

Jeremy Scahill: I want to ask you about the taking of civilian captives on October 7. Hamas officials have told me that their forces did not have any orders to take women who were not soldiers or children back to Gaza as captives. Hamas has told me that essentially when the fence and the wall encircling Gaza was broken down and the second and third wave of people came in—this included ordinary people or people that were not officially involved in the operation—that they started taking Israeli civilians back to Gaza and then Hamas had to essentially find these people and offered to return them to Israel. What is your understanding of the civilians taken to Gaza?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: Hamas already declared that. In Islamic Jihad, we had a boy and an elderly lady. We issued a statement at an early stage saying we wanted to release them both, without anything in exchange, should the security conditions be available. This was publicly stated and filmed at the time. So, yes, this issue was there, especially that children, women, and elderly people were taken in by mistake. We declared our position, and you may go back to the records. We said we have these people in our custody, and they appeared in a video, the young boy and elderly lady, and we were ready to let them go just like that should the security conditions allow for it. They were then released within the first deal.

Jeremy Scahill: How do you think history is going to see the events of October 7 and the months that have unfolded since?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: A huge strategic failure for Israel on October 7 at all levels: the political, military, and intelligence. It was also a failure for the protectors of Israel. The nine months that followed were just more failure because they committed crimes against civilians, destroyed Gaza, employed the starvation policy. All those add to the military and moral failure. Israel’s image has been damaged. The image of victimization which it sold to the world for years is over. It has become a wanted criminal. So, Israel has lost at the level of its image and narrative and at the moral level. Further, the army has not achieved any of its objectives and has been exhausted. So those successive months have only been more failure at all levels: military, political, moral, and in terms of Israel’s image.

Jeremy Scahill: You’re the chief political negotiator for Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Are you directly participating in the negotiations over a ceasefire or ending the siege on Gaza?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: I would like to make one thing clear. In these negotiations, we as resistance factions have mandated Hamas to lead the negotiations. We agreed that Hamas would manage the negotiations for various reasons. We are reassured that Hamas will not yield in these negotiations because it is more in the crosshairs than Islamic Jihad.

So, papers are put forward in those negotiations, be it from Israel, the U.S., or others. Hamas presents those papers to us, and we discuss them and offer feedback. Based on this, Hamas responds. So, the response is not that of Hamas but of the resistance and its factions.

Hamas is the chief negotiator mandated by the resistance factions. It discusses the proposals made with the resistance factions and provides a response that is a reflection of the resistance factions’ view. Hamas is mandated and authorized to negotiate on behalf of the factions.

The other point is that Israel has tried to drive a wedge among resistance factions in terms of the negotiations. Netanyahu has personally asked the UN representative to meet him in Jerusalem around four months ago. Netanyahu and his negotiations team asked him to go to Lebanon and meet the Islamic Jihad to convey a message saying that Netanyahu was ready to engage in direct negotiations with Islamic Jihad and that he would be lenient in reaching an agreement with them on prisoners exchange.

It was around three months ago, the UN representative came to meet one of our brothers in Lebanon, an Islamic Jihad official, and he delivered Netanyahu’s message. We realized that Netanyahu was trying to create a fracture between Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and we did not give him that chance. We announced this at the time, but we did not try to make a big fuss about it. We talked about it in a Lebanese newspaper, Al-Akhbar. Some Israeli papers talked about this issue the day after. Some regional powers also tried to invite Islamic Jihad to meetings and discussions, but we kept that door shut, too. I mean to have a delegation and make visits, but we realized that they were trying to initiate individual negotiations, so we just turned these proposals down.

One State, Two States, or Perpetual State of War?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: In the West Bank, the resistance is present and escalating and the Islamic Jihad takes part in it or even takes the lead in it. There are arrests in the West Bank on a daily basis. Not a day passes by without arrests and other crimes being committed. There have been more than 500 martyrs in the West Bank since October 7 and around 10,000 detainees in addition to thousands of wounded people. So the West Bank is indeed taking part. However, due to the magnitude of crimes committed in Gaza, this does not feature much on the media.

Internationally, there are also other open fronts in Lebanon and in the Red Sea in Yemen. Their fronts are backing the Gaza front. They have decided that the battle on those fronts will not end until the aggression on the Gaza Strip stops. The Islamic Jihad is present in Lebanon, given there are refugee camps in Lebanon and it is part of this confrontation in Lebanon. However, it is Hezbollah that constitutes the main part of this front.

Jeremy Scahill: Do you think the conditions are present for a full intifada at this point?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: I believe the political horizon in the West Bank is blocked. We have an extremist government in Israel which does not believe—the program of the members or components of the government is publicly known. When [Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel] Smotrich talks about the options for Palestinians being either to completely surrender and work as wageworkers for Israel, to be displaced, or to be killed. This is what they call the resolve program. It is a declared program. And he is a fundamental part of this Zionist government. [Israeli National Security Minister Itamar] Ben-Gvir also has a similar program. So the political horizon for a Palestinian state is blocked and the Palestinian people know it. On the other hand, the magnitude of crimes Israel is committing in the Gaza Strip have shown they could not come from a state which claims to be the oasis of democracy in the region nor an army governed by laws and rules. Rather, it is a gang of murderers and criminals killing civilians, women, and children, whose leaders are being prosecuted in international courts for war crimes. So, the blocked horizon and the magnitude of these crimes leads precisely to an intifada.

The form the intifada is currently taking in the West Bank involves little popular participation due to the huge security crackdown by Israel. As I mentioned, there are more than 10,000 detainees in the enemy’s prisons. Also, the operations have not ceased. These people are not without families, supporters, organizations; the same goes for detainees. This magnitude paves the way for a big popular uprising in the near future hopefully.

I would like to add that there is no Hamas in the West Bank nor is there an October 7. What is there in the West Bank is Oslo. Nonetheless, assaults by settlers in the West Bank are commonplace. Thousands of settlers are being armed away from any formal structures even the Zionist army and police. These are Ben-Gvir’s militias. The crimes being perpetrated in the West Bank are unprecedented. The settlements that are being built today and recognized are arbitrary settler clusters which even radical Israeli governments had refused to recognize. Nonetheless, they are being legalized now.

Palestinians in Gaza are killed. In the West Bank, however, they lose their lands which are turned into settlements and lose their livelihoods. That’s why the situation in the West Bank will explode, and I believe it is going to be a big bloody conflict. The West is now turning a blind eye and talking about Gaza and the administration of Gaza, but Israel and Netanyahu refuse even the presence of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. He is trying to come up with alternatives away from the Palestinian Authority, which is working in the West Bank in accordance with the Oslo Accord, restricting itself by the so-called “security coordination.” Hence, the horizon is completely blocked. The conflict in the West Bank is going to be bloody. Then the West would turn and say, “two-state solution.” But that’s nonsense because what we see on the ground is more relevant than the statements we hear and which have no value.

Jeremy Scahill: The most cliché question any reporter asks any Palestinian is, “What do you think about the two-state solution?” But that is what is being pushed by the Biden administration. When I’ve interviewed officials from Hamas, they say that if the democratic will of the Palestinian people was to establish a state along the 1967 borders, Hamas would not stand in the way of this. What is the position of Palestinian Islamic Jihad on this?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: This is not a realistic question. It is not as though anything depends on this question. Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo Accords and accepted the two-state solution and he was the head of the PLO; he signed on its behalf. Thirty-one years later, the lands on which the Palestinian state was supposed to be established have become the second Israel. They have become a state for settlers. It seems that a two-state solution was about the first state of Israel of 1948 and the second Israel in 1967.

Even Gaza has been under a suffocating blockade for 17 years because no one wants Gaza, this narrow strip of land on which 2.5 million Palestinians live. So with the question of the two-state solution, the West asks, “What is Hamas’s position on the two-state solution?” But Yasser Arafat had already signed off on the two-state solution 31 years ago, and it was for nothing. Some journalists ask about the position of Islamic Jihad of a two-state solution, but no one asks the Israeli parties who constitute the government and are members in the Knesset and who are calling for eliminating the Palestinian cause and displacing the Palestinian people in whole, calling for a transfer while being in the Zionist decision-making position. So, we object to putting the Palestinian people to a test by asking, “What is the position of the factions on the two-state solution?” This is not logical.

On the other hand, Hamas is sometimes forced to answer this question because it is administering the Gaza Strip and everybody wants to ask Hamas, “What if it were the wish of the Palestinian people?” But Israel refuses that solution, objects to it and resists it. It is building a state on the lands that were supposed to become the lands of the Palestinian state. Now some propose a one-state solution. If they are really keen on democracy, there is a Palestinian population in the occupied lands across historic Palestine. What about state governance? Why doesn’t anyone ask about one state where all citizens enjoy the same rights?

So as a matter of principle, I believe we are in a national liberation stage which requires resistance. When there is a partner willing to solve the Palestinian issue, whether in Israel or the West, especially the United States, only then they can talk. Now, however, talking of a two-state solution offers the Palestinian people mere illusions as though the U.S. administration and the West are keen on the two-state solution. The American wizard has just pulled this out from their pocket to throw it against Al-Aqsa Flood. That’s all! They are even talking about a renewed authority, not even about the Palestinian Authority which is the partner in the two-state solution. They are talking about a new authority and no one even knows what that is. Nonetheless, Israel refuses that proposal. It says the Israeli army will re-occupy the Gaza Strip, but because of the security concerns and the heavy cost of such return, Israel wants to find some sort of agents in the administration of Gaza and when they fail, then [Secretary of State Antony] Blinken for example would make a statement saying we don’t accept occupation, we don’t accept that Hamas manages Gaza, we don’t accept chaos. Tell us please, what is the alternative? Make a proposal. So the problem is not with the Palestinian people nor with Palestinian factions to answer this question. The problem is basically that Israel does not want to give us any of our rights and the American administration sponsors this Israeli position and does not dare, for many reasons, to face this blocked horizon.

Our problem lies in the injustice inflicted upon us, the aggression against us. Our problem is not with the Jews, not with the Americans. It is injustice. So, if Netanyahu stood on the highest minaret in Palestine, or the minaret of Al-Aqsa Mosque and embraced Islam, the problem would not be over. Our problem with Netanyahu and Israel is because they occupied our land, killed our people, and they are engaging in aggression against us. Even if he embraced Islam, the problem would still be there. The Americans must understand this.

Jeremy Scahill: What would an acceptable resolution look like from your perspective?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: Look, let’s agree on some basic rules. After 76 years, the Palestinian people have not given in, and they started Al-Aqsa Flood. Israel is governed by an unprecedented radical government that believes only in ending the conflict with a resolve that is full of racism and grudge. This puts things at an unreconcilable position.

For us as Palestinians, and I’m not talking about a resistance group, Islamic Jihad or Hamas, unless we achieve our rights, there will be no stability in the region. The whole world is shifting. There are ongoing international conflicts which affect the Palestinian issue and are affected by it. The region is also changing. The region today is not what it was ten years ago when it seemed the Arabs had turned their backs on the Palestinian people and the whole thing was over. It is clear now that there are back up fronts supporting the Palestinian cause. The internal Palestinian setting is also shifting.

After more than 30 years, Oslo is over. The Palestinian Authority is now being used as a security tool. It is clear that the constituency of Fatah is also engaging in the confrontation against Israel and is not content with the position of the [Palestinian] Authority. The Palestinian resistance in Gaza has persevered in Gaza for nine months and is still in good shape and ready to persist in a way no one could expect. All those changes must be taken into account when talking about the Palestinian cause. The rights of the Palestinian people at the bare minimum which was agreed upon involved a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This is the minimum which the Palestinian people could accept as a first stage. We are not against Jews living amongst us in the region, but they can’t dominate, take control, and lead the region and arrange it on security terms in accordance with their interests and those of their allies. This region has its people who have rights which they will not give up.

Time is in favor of the Palestinian people, despite all the pain we experience. All those illusions in the minds of Israeli leaders are shattering before the new reality in the region and the world.

Jeremy Scahill: Do you believe that Jews who emigrated from Europe or the United States or Australia or South Africa have a right to live in that state?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: We don’t have a problem with them if they were not conspiring, engaging in aggression, inflicting injustice, controlling the region. We don’t have a problem otherwise.

Jeremy Scahill: What purpose do Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority serve right now?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: Mahmoud Abbas has a vision and a project which were translated into the Oslo Accord. Now, 31 years on, the vision of Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority is evaporating. They’ve become completely irrelevant whether for political partnership with Israel or for the resistance. So this whole project is coming to its long-expected end. I believe the PA’s project is disintegrating over time.

First, it has not yielded the bare minimum expectations it was built upon. Second, Israel is only dealing with it temporarily to manage the situation in the West Bank while it has no true sovereignty whatsoever, even in Area B. In Area A, too, there is no real sovereignty whatsoever. Israel enters those areas whenever it wants, arrests whoever it wants in Area A. So with time, I believe any opinion poll in the West Bank will find that most Palestinian people are with the resistance, not with the PA. So the Oslo project was basically what Yasser Arafat and then Mahmoud Abbas hoped would evolve into a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel, however, wanted it to be a tool to manage the Palestinian people so it would be an easy, uncostly occupation. The balance of power helped Israel achieve that goal, achieve its vision of this agreement. On the ground, it stripped the PA of any sovereignty and rendered it into a tool to manage Palestinian communities. Then it built that separation wall which devoured large swathes of the West Bank, built these settlements, Judaized Jerusalem. Thus, the PA project is almost over.

Jeremy Scahill: Would it be better for the Palestinian people if there was no PA? What would replace it?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: The alternative would be an internal Palestinian agreement. There are fundamental Palestinian powers which did not exist when the PLO was built. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are not in the PLO despite being primary active powers on the ground. The PLO comprises factions. Fatah, as a faction, is present and has its impact and constituency. But most other factions are marginal factions with no significant presence. Internal Palestinian arrangements must now be built on the realities and the actors on the ground rather than on the situation back in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, rebuilding the PLO is, in my opinion, the best way to approach rearranging the internal Palestinian structure.

Jeremy Scahill: If the negotiations between Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Israelis result in the freeing of Marwan Barghouti, would you support his candidacy to become president of an independent internationally recognized Palestine? [Note: Barghouti is a Palestinian resistance leader imprisoned by Israel since 2002. While he is a member of the ruling Fatah party, he was a vocal critic of the Oslo agreement, and Hamas and PIJ have consistently demanded his freedom. Sometimes referred to as the Palestinian Nelson Mandela, he is widely viewed as the most popular choice among Palestinians to be a future president of an independent state.]

Mohammed Al-Hindi: It is premature to say. First, there is the issue of releasing Marwan Barghouti. Of course, we demand releasing all Palestinian prisoners including leaders of the Palestinian resistance, Marwan Barghouti, all of them. The question of running for president later is something for Fatah to decide. Barghouti is a leader of Fatah and if they nominate him, then this can be discussed. So Islamic Jihad or Hamas, just for being the reason for his release will not support or otherwise oppose him. It is for Fatah to nominate him, and then we look into all the candidates and we reach certain agreements. So this is quite premature. But I can say that in Islamic Jihad, we are keen on having a solid, strong, and cohesive Fatah that is internally unified.

The Axis of Resistance

Jeremy Scahill: In the broader news media there is a lot of reporting that asserts that Palestinian Islamic Jihad is supported quite significantly by Iran, and I wanted to ask you about the relationship with Iran and if these reports are true that there is military and financial support being given by Tehran to Palestinian Islamic Jihad?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: We are a Palestinian resistance movement. Our struggle started before the Iranian Revolution. The struggle of the Palestinian people has been ongoing for 76 years. We are grateful and appreciate all those who stand by our side. Now, Iran stands by the Palestinian people and the Palestinian resistance. It supports the Palestinian people and resistance with all that the Palestinian people may need. This is declared and obvious for everyone. It is no secret. The Islamic Jihad movement started in terms of discussion and internal dialogue before the 1979 revolution. We started in the mid-1970s. We started resistance in the early 1980s before having any relations with the Islamic Republic. We were in occupation prisons in the Gaza Strip and we did not know anyone from Iran. We started because we had our vision and understanding of history and politics in the region. So we fulfilled our duty. Now, Iran comes and supports us. We appreciate this support. Especially at a time when the Arabs abandon us, go to Israel and reach agreements with it.

When it comes to Iran, the big fuss in the Western media and even in the region was caused by Israel who is trying to say, in the context of normalization with the Arabs, that there is a new enemy for the Arabs in the region while Israel is becoming an ally rather than an enemy. This is the context within which the Iranian role is discussed and the Iranian support for the resistance which Israel and part of the West designate as terrorist. Therefore, it invented that enemy suggesting that the region has Israel, who is an ally to Sunni states in the region, and there are agreements and peace deals being reached while there is an enemy that constitutes a threat to everyone, both the Sunni states and Israel. This enemy is Iran which is supporting ‘terrorist movements’ in the region, namely the Palestinian resistance. Israel is thus trying to invade the whole region as such. However, Iran is not a transient state.

If we look at the populations inhabiting this region for thousands of years, we see Arabs, Persians, and Turks. Iran is nothing new. It is a recognized state in the region and has its interests. Arabs and non-Arabs recognize these interests. It is a state that cannot be overlooked in the region. Israel is the transient state. That’s why it is trying to change the equation. These accusations are leveled at the Islamic Jihad or Hamas or the Palestinian resistance suggesting they follow Iranian commands or as though they are part of this alliance deemed as “devilish” against Western and world interests.

Jeremy Scahill: Is it true that there is a command center of sorts where the factions—whether it’s Iran or the Islamic resistance in Iraq or the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad—is there an official agreement on coordination in resistance?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: Whether there is or there is not is not a matter of media discussion. There is resistance engaged in a battle right now, a confrontation. There are back up fronts. That’s all that can be said on this matter. This is what is publicly known and declared. I have nothing to say.

Jeremy Scahill: What’s your current political analysis of what might happen in Lebanon? It seems as though the Israelis want at least to engage in some form of more intense warfare against Lebanon, against Hezbollah. The Biden administration has indicated it would support Israel in such a war.

Mohammed Al-Hindi: Hezbollah declared they opened a backup front since October 8 and that confrontations on this front will not stop unless the aggression on Gaza stops. Now, Israel is threatening to expand the war and some hardline voices in the Israeli government are calling for a full-fledged war in south Lebanon. But I believe it is unlikely. First of all, Israel is exhausted; its army is exhausted in the Gaza Strip. For nine months so far, they have not been able to resolve anything or achieve any of its declared goals. It is sinking in the Gaza quicksand. Despite all the violence and massacres, Israel’s options in Gaza now are hard. Be it staying in Gaza, or having a partial withdrawal and redeployment and maintaining the Philadelphi Corridor or Netzarim Corridor, or complete withdrawal. Israel is unable to resolve any of its problems in Gaza. So, how can it take an exhausted army to a war in south Lebanon? They know Hezbollah has multiple times the capabilities of the resistance in Gaza.

It also knows that Hezbollah territory is not like Gaza, i.e., open like a football field. The topography is quite different. The front in Lebanon, also, is not closed like Gaza but could be said to extend from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea.

On the other hand, what targets does Israel have in Lebanon? Are there military targets or economic facilities of Hezbollah for Israel to target? Israel might destroy the southern suburb of Beirut in terms of buildings. But what targets are there in Lebanon? None. In Israel, there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of military and economic targets for Hezbollah. They have published some such targets around two weeks ago. The targets were filmed and published.

Further, is the decision to wage a war on Lebanon a purely Israeli decision? Or does it need an American approval or greenlight in a decision which could drag the region into a regional war which may be hard to contain? The Americans are not in a position now to allow for a war that may expand into a regional war at such critical times with the upcoming elections, the war in Ukraine, and other issues. That’s why I believe all Israeli threats, particularly by Netanyahu and his minister Gallant, are just empty words.

Jeremy Scahill: Do you feel betrayed by the Arab nations in general in this situation post-October 7? Do you think the approach to the Abraham Accords and the other negotiations that the U.S. is engaged in to try to normalize relations between Israel and Arab nation states represents a betrayal of the Palestinian cause?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: Since the beginning of the normalization agreements, the Abraham Accords, it was clear that the Arabs have abandoned their previously held position adopted in the Arab Summit in Beirut in 2002, which talks about willingness to normalize relations with Israel only when the Palestinian issue is addressed through the two-state solution. Then they made this leap in the Abraham Accords, namely normalization; they had made up their minds. However, now we have October 7. What was before October 7 is different from what comes after, including for the regimes which have normalized relations with Israel.

The vision of these regimes depends on the outcome of this war. So, everybody is waiting to see what this confrontation in Gaza will bring. It is clear that Israel has not achieved any of its goals so far and will emerge in a different light, not the light in which it was seen when it signed the Abraham Accords. In the Abraham Accords, it was regarded as a strong state that can replace the U.S. when it gradually withdraws from the region to southeast Asia for its confrontations with China and the Russians. Israel would take the lead in the region. This perception has now changed. And based on the outcome of the battle in Gaza, it is clear things will continue to be different from before.

Of course, we will not see quick and clear results at the beginning, but these are states who have interests. I expect these states would, in the medium term or sooner, start to act based on the rules upon which the region would be built after October 7.

How Does the Palestinian Resistance View Biden vs. Trump?

Jeremy Scahill: I’ve reviewed your history going back to the 1980s, and you’ve been been in this struggle through many U.S. administrations. What is Joe Biden’s place in history?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: We kind of miss Trump now, his debates and statements. President Biden is not to be seen as one person, but he represents the Democratic Party which has a clear policy. He is an expert. President Biden is not a newcomer to politics. He is an expert with extensive experience. He spent a lifetime working in politics as a senator, vice-president, etc. He is a veteran [politician]. He represents the Democratic Party quite well. He has a grasp of balances in the international arena. He made a mistake, probably, when he led the battle by coming to Israel and attending the first cabinet of war.

I believe his calculations failed him in this regard. Netanyahu, who has a long experience in dealing with the various administrations, especially during elections, was the winner in this case with Biden’s blunt involvement in the war. Netanyahu went to the Congress during the Obama administration. He has prior experience. He is going to go there now, too. It is clear he will try to linger in Gaza until the U.S. elections, in one way or another, in the hope things will be resolved if Trump wins the elections.

The U.S. administration is restricted, be it Democrats or Republicans. They are bound by internal affairs, lobbies, capitalists, businesspeople. U.S. elections are affected by all those factors. Quite frankly, we don’t count much on the outcome of those elections.

At the grassroots level in the American society, at the level of the youth, there are genuine shifts and many free and humane voices that are spreading in universities. Even the American officer who torched himself—we would build a monument for him not just in Gaza but in our hearts. These are quite strong manifestations. However, these free and humane moves would not translate—and we do not expect them to translate—into policies which would govern the U.S. administration.

Jeremy Scahill: I’m wondering if you think the situation for Palestinians would be better if Trump won instead of Biden?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: I believe this depends on how things evolve on certain issues. Trump, at the end of the day, just like Biden, would be looking after American interests. So, developments in the region, developments in the world, the war in Ukraine, tensions with China, all those are factors that influence any American president, Democrat or Republican. I believe the world is shifting, the region is changing, the Palestinian people are moving, the Palestinian resistance has proven that it is not a player that can be overlooked. There are existing regional powers that support the Palestinian people. All of this must be taken into account. The ongoing war in Ukraine, its outcomes and trends, the rules it instills, the conflict with China, all these issues will affect the approach adopted by Trump or any Democrat president, be it Biden, if he continues as a candidate, or any other Democrat candidate. We prefer to have a candidate other than Biden, though.

Israel’s strategic weight in the region has undoubtedly been affected. How would regional states, allies of the U.S., look at Israel now after this failure on October 7 and for over nine months? This is important. How would the world regard Israel as well? In the eyes of the world and the region, would Israel, who have failed so miserably before Gaza, be a reliable ally to be trusted with protecting the region and securing its security and political and economic future? So, any future president will find those changes on the table and they cannot be disregarded. Especially if he is a businessman like Trump.

The UN Secretary General spoke in honest, human and strong terms and exposed Israel. The ICJ and ICC are rightly prosecuting Israel. Yet we are concerned that all the resonance of these crimes would fade away and cool down with time. That is why it is very important for us that the U.S., especially the new generation, would maintain this relationship, which is not about Palestine alone. Rather, Palestine has become a symbol of resisting injustice, imperialism, and encroachment on humanity at large. These are crimes unprecedented in human history being broadcast for the first time on air around the clock.

I would like to stress one more time, there are some Jewish voices, especially in the United States, who are better than some Arabs and Muslims. Zionism is an idea and a policy. One might find Arabs or Muslims who are Zionist, too. Just like there are Christian and Jewish Zionists, there are Muslim Zionists. So, I reiterate again that we respect all those voices, those free voices who want humanity to prevail at the end of this battle, and we believe our battle in Palestine is the battle of all against injustice, encroachment, grudge, racism: a battle against all those evils which the American people oppose.

All the more so because this conflict will not be over with the end of this war. It is an open conflict. So, while we understand these voices will not be translated into policies overnight, since this is an open conflict, these voices will have a significant impact in the future. There have been some important American examples such as Rachel Corrie who stood before the bulldozer in the past in Rafah. [Note: Corrie was an American activist who was killed in Rafah, Gaza, in 2003 as she tried to prevent Israeli forces from demolishing Palestinian homes.]

Jeremy Scahill: I read the U.S. State Department designation of you as a specially designated terrorist and I’d like to hear your comment on that designation.

Mohammed Al-Hindi: I believe the Americans do not know Mohammed Al-Hindi. It is the Israelis who introduced me to them, so this designation is ultimately Israeli. They said, “These are terrorists.” At the time, when they designated me years ago, they said as deputy secretary general of Islamic Jihad, he holds responsibility for the movement’s acts of resistance. So, the Americans took decisions that had no value whatsoever like freezing assets. I have never been to the U.S., nor do I have a dime in American banks or other banks. So, these decisions are just without any value and have no bearing on the ground. I believe these are Israeli decisions par excellence.

There is a sheikh associated with the founding of the Islamic Jihad movement. His name was Abd Al Aziz Awda. He returned to Gaza after the Oslo Accord. An American newspaper wrote about him at the time saying he was a founding member of the Islamic Jihad and mentioned his name among four names which the paper said were dangerous and wanted. He was told the Americans are saying so-and-so about you. He said that is not important. What is important is that Israel knows the truth.

The Americans see the region with only one lens, which is Israel’s, because it is their project. So, all those decisions have no bearing and no value for the resistance but only make us more determined.

Jeremy Scahill: Is there any message that you would want to send to the American people or the U.S. government?

Mohammed Al-Hindi: The American people are free people. The movements we see in American universities and the voices of important American figures give us hope. We appreciate all this, and we believe that humanity will prevail, hopefully soon. For us, in Palestine, it is our duty to fight the Zionist project as a threat not just to the Palestinians but to the whole region. In short, there can be no security or stability in the region unless the Palestinian people access their minimum rights. Now Al-Aqsa Flood has brought the conflict back to square one in a way no one could foresee. This is not the message of Hamas alone. This is the message of the Palestinian people as a whole.

source: Drop Site News