Preliminary Training: Ten Thousand Projectiles Cripple a Third of the Entity

The following is a translation of “Preliminary Training: Ten Thousand Projectiles Cripple a Third of the Entity!,” published today in Al-Akhbar by Ibrahim Al-Amin.

The article describes how the resistance in Lebanon has  demonstrated its capability to target over 100 vital military and infrastructure sites within the zionist entity, utilizing a range of diverse projectiles, which would cripple the enemy’s operational capacity and cause massive destruction and displacement. This readiness and strategy ensure that any large-scale military surprise by the enemy will fail to incapacitate the resistance’s qualitative capabilities, allowing the resistance to sustain and escalate its operations.

Preliminary Training: Ten Thousand Projectiles Cripple a Third of the Entity

The readiness file of the resistance to face any large-scale war with the enemy is not only about what the resistance publishes regarding its target bank within the entity, but also what the experiences of the past nine months have shown in terms of capabilities. While the period following the 2006 aggression up to Al-Aqsa Flood battle was filled with hints and warnings directed by the resistance to the leaders, army, and settlers of the enemy, the current escalation probabilities impose a different pattern of deterrence messages.

Previously, alongside the speeches of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah about Hezbollah’s qualitative capabilities, the resistance broadcast a video rare in its content after the enemy threatened to bomb sites near Beirut Airport. It included coordinates of military sites, security headquarters, and special devices set up by the enemy near residential, educational, and civilian centers. The video concluded with a phrase by Sayyed Nasrallah stating that if you strike targets among our civilians, we will do the same for you.

In September 2018, Sayyed Nasrallah addressed the occupation army stating that “the resistance possesses precise and imprecise missiles and weaponry capabilities that impose a fate and reality on ‘israel’ that it never expected.” Then, last summer, he declared that the resistance “needs only a few precise missiles to destroy a list of targets including civilian and military airports, air force bases, power plants, water stations, along with a group of infrastructure and oil refineries, most notably the Dimona reactor.”

Throughout its deterrence campaign, Hezbollah publicly announced some of what the enemy knows, thanks to its vast intelligence efforts, announcing publicly its ability to reach central targets for the entity, whether military, strategic infrastructure, or public service centers. Hezbollah has gradually escalated the level of warning and threat, corresponding to the enemy’s efforts against the resistance and its human and logistical infrastructure, especially during the “war between wars” phase, during which the enemy undertook a triangular strategy:

• Attempting to strike what it assumes to be weapons on their way to Hezbollah through air strikes.
• Conducting military-security operations on supply routes by enemy intelligence.
• Sabotage operations deep within Lebanon, the latter being the most dangerous, revealing many details about the enemy’s actions or plans, especially when it found itself “forced” to carry out exceptional operations, such as the drone operation that exploded over the southern suburb [of Beirut, Dahiye] in August 2019, preceded and followed by attempts by “israeli” commando teams to reach resistance facilities in various Lebanese areas. These attempts aimed to strike what “israel” considers advanced weapons manufacturing centers or operations converting unguided missiles into precision ones. The enemy’s intelligence efforts in this area were not limited to such operations alone but included many other activities, the details of which the resistance might reveal later.

As we find ourselves in the midst of a difficult war, during which the enemy intensifies its crimes against Palestinians, and with increasing likelihood of escalation on the Lebanese front, despite indicators declining last week, the resistance is effectively enhancing its readiness for a comprehensive confrontation. It has decided to raise the level of threatening messages to convey to the enemy’s public, a significant portion of its political leadership, most of those involved with public affairs, along with the military and security levels, that once the war becomes comprehensive, the resistance has a plan that differs from all estimations.

In a theoretical and practical exercise of what the situation could be, and based on the three films broadcasted by the resistance— “Hudhud 1,” “Hudhud 2,” and “To Whom it May Concern”—the following can be assumed:

The resistance presented over 100 vital targets, including conventional or newly established military sites and barracks, artillery and air force operational centers, war operations management centers, intelligence collection and electronic warfare centers, espionage tools of various kinds, radar systems, sensing and tracking systems, in addition to command and control centers, arms and ammunition depots, and tank and essential vehicle positions, including air defense systems comprising radars, control systems, and launch platforms.

Additionally, the resistance showcased over 50 targets involving the central infrastructure of the enemy entity, ranging from central or secondary airports and seaports to power production and distribution stations, and control centers of oil resources, regarding tanks, refineries, or petrochemical factories, reaching civilian installations involving residential complexes (for senior employees and business people in the northern private industries), and settlement communities (comprising ordinary people or craftsmen and farmers) established before and after the entity’s creation. The resistance also pointed out a significant number of service centers belonging to these civilian communities, including commercial centers and food production factories.

The resistance conducted a survey of an area constituting the northern center of the entity, extending from the sea in the west to the eastern edges of the occupied Golan, within an area of approximately 3,650 square kilometers. Notably, the videos did not reveal highly sensitive details about advanced industries generating billions of dollars annually for the entity and its private sector, which comprehensive war would expose not only to direct losses but also to disruptions and delays of major projects being worked on in alliance and cooperation with international institutions in the east and west.

If we rely on what the enemy leaks, further highlighted by global intelligence agencies and research institutions working with them, and if we add what the resistance has revealed in terms of weapons over the past nine months, along with the weapons that have appeared in the hands of factions and forces from the Axis of the Resistance in the region—whether used on land, sea, or air—along with presumed weapons publicly disclosed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which the enemy assumes are now possessed by Hezbollah, this is sufficient to conclude that the simple theoretical exercise indicates the following:

Firstly, the nature of the measures taken by all parties involved in a wide-scale war has deprived the enemy of the element of surprise. Any sudden military operation, whether an aerial campaign or even ground invasions, will not succeed in disabling the qualitative capabilities of the resistance, nor will it be able to paralyze or render them inoperative.

Secondly, the enemy’s air defense systems, from Iron Domes to David’s Sling, and from “Hetz” [Arrow] and Patriot systems, along with warplanes, helicopters, and drones that can be used to counter projectiles in the air, possess operational capabilities that allow them to face a wide initial barrage, with results not exceeding 50%. It should be noted that the enemy’s ability to reload air defense systems may not be possible within a few hours.

The strategy of dispersion tested by the resistance in Lebanon will not, under the most severe circumstances, require launching more than ten thousand varies projectiles, ranging from drones (no one knows what types will be used in a comprehensive war) to (highly effective) artillery shells, conventional missiles, cruise or ballistic missiles, and even unknown types of missiles in terms of range, speed, and destructive capabilities.

This quantity of projectiles is sufficient to destroy and disable all the aforementioned targets, and will constitute a raid operation the enemy has never faced before, placing the resistance in a position to reorganize subsequent raid rounds, with a serious possibility of launching a major ground operation deep into the occupied north.

The initial result will be massive destruction affecting the enemy’s military, civilian, and strategic infrastructure, with the displacement of more than one and a half million settlers, in a state of chaos that does not even resemble that seen in the settlements of the Gaza envelope on the morning of October 7.

All this, while we are talking about an operation whose geographical scope is still in the northern third of the occupation entity. However, no one can delve into the mind of the resistance to determine whether the stat will be exclusively from the north or potentially from another location, where the entity’s nerve center lies. Everyone knows, at least the enemy, that the resistance conducts comprehensive informational surveys of the entire occupation entity, and this surveillance is conducted continuously, achieving significant results for the ongoing bombardments by rockets or drones, which belong to a generation that dates back at least a decade.

translated by RNN