Left in disbelief, an already drained Zionist military is left without any viable solutions to the ever-growing threat of first-person view (FPV) drones, now used by Hezbollah to overwhelm their newly assumed positions in southern Lebanon.
On April 16, Tel Aviv and Beirut agreed to a temporary ceasefire imposed by US President Donald Trump. Within the first hour of the ceasefire’s imposition, Israel had already violated the agreement 10 times, including an attack on an ambulance. What they sought to achieve was a return to the pre-war status quo, whereby the Israeli military attacked Lebanon at will, without any return fire.
It soon became clear that the 15-month ceasefire period, following November 27, 2024, during which the Israeli military violated the agreement 15,400 times according to UNIFIL, was not going to be replicated. The first wave of retaliation against Israeli violations began with Hezbollah detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and destroying convoys of Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs), after carrying out reconnaissance and anticipating the movement of armed convoys.
Initially, the Israeli military passed three successive IED attacks off as incidents occurring due to explosives previously left behind by Hezbollah fighters. Later, the Lebanese Party officially announced it had taken out four Israeli Merkava tanks in a single IED attack, forcing the Israelis to issue a statement acknowledging it.
Before long, Hezbollah was issuing statements claiming responsibility for a number of retaliatory attacks each day, including rocket fire on Israeli army positions across the Lebanon Blue Line (Lebanese border).
Then came the prominence of Hezbollah’s usage of the cheap, but highly effective FPV drones, inflicting considerable numbers of casualties amongst Israeli soldiers in retaliation for ceasefire violations and the attempt to illegally occupy a strip of territory in southern Lebanon.
Contrary to Israel’s initial claims to have established a considerable “buffer zone” and that only a small number of Hezbollah fighters had remained in the area, it would become clear that nothing of the sort had truly taken place. There was never any “full operational control” of the “buffer zone”, instead, the Israelis were practicing the Gaza strategy of deploying forces in their heavily armoured vehicles to towns and villages, where they would then be tasked with blowing up civilian infrastructure.
Hezbollah fighters remain positioned throughout this newly declared zone, a terrain that favors a defending force using guerrilla warfare tactics. Perhaps the most menacing is the usage of the FPV drones for both reconnaissance and attacks alike.
In a new article, written for Yediot Aharanot in Hebrew, correspondent Elisha Ben Kimon wrote the following:
“For years, the IDF has invested billions in sophisticated interception systems, precision missiles, and the intelligence capabilities of superpowers. But when Hezbollah, with simple and deadly ingenuity, decided to lower its flight altitude and switch to drones, with fiber optics that make it difficult to detect and intercept, Israel found itself in a situation of dealing with a “low-tech” threat that disrupted all work plans.”
The FPV UAVs can be cheaply acquired for only hundreds of dollars per unit, yet when assembled domestically, they can be put together for as little as 50 dollars in some instances. Successful FPV drone deployment for war was pioneered by the Ukrainians and Russians during the Ukraine War. According to some sources, the majority of battlefield casualties in that war have been a result of this drone, which Kyiv can mass-produce at around 300 dollars per unit.
Equipped with a fiber-optic cable, the drones are completely immune to electronic warfare jamming, negating the high-tech advantages that the Israelis have previously enjoyed. Hezbollah does have access to a range of different attack drones, including various Iranian models, which have proven highly effective also. Yet, they are not available in as high quantities, and their most sophisticated technology is used to target high-value targets.
This development has meant that Hezbollah drone operator teams can safely fly these drones from up to and over 10 kilometers away, without being detected. The process of detecting these drones is the same as it is for Hezbollah’s arsenal of more sophisticated radio frequency (RF) drones, relying on acoustic sensors, radars and thermal imaging, yet FPV drones fly at such low altitudes and use the terrain of southern Lebanon to make them more difficult to detect until it is too late.
A recent article published by the Israeli daily Haaretz noted that back in 2024, the Israeli political and military leadership claimed to be on top of deploying solutions to the Hezbollah drone threat, stressing that a range of Israeli defense companies were engineering solutions.
However, an anonymous source “involved in the field” told Haaretz that “There is a need for a systemic response – not to acquire a little of this and a little of that, but a broad plan to address all unmanned threats along our borders. DDR&D (Directorate of Defense Research & Development) has known about this threat for many years but has not mobilized to address it.”
In a nightmare situation for the Israeli military, Hezbollah recently launched a retaliatory attack using FPV drones, inflicting 6 soldier casualties near the Lebanese town of Taybeh. Israel announced that one of its sergeants, Ithan Fukes, was killed in the attack. What happened next was perhaps even more damning.
Hezbollah followed up their attack with an FPV drone strike targeting the medivac helicopter. The incident caused such a stir because the Israeli military leaked videos of the incident. Despite the Israeli soldiers wearing body cams or GoPros on their helmets, this was the first time such footage has been released, due to Israel’s strict military censor laws.
The first video released was from a distance, showing the FPV drone impacting the site where the evacuation of soldiers was happening, causing them to fall back and the helicopter to abruptly take off. From the footage, it was unclear whether the drone hit any target or not, triggering criticism from the Israeli media over why it was released.
Then, a second video was released, from a soldier’s helmet camera, revealing that the drone fell just short, either due to the wind force of the helicopter or due to the soldier’s gunfire. Any release of footage of this kind is deliberate; in this case, it was to jolt the Israeli leadership into action.
An enormous amount of criticism has been leveled at the Israeli political leadership over its failure to achieve its announced goals in Lebanon, and the army itself is even joining that parade. What this demonstrates is that the psychological impact of the FPVs is greatly burdening soldiers on the ground, while the army is left to sit in southern Lebanon twiddling its thumbs.
Hezbollah’s asymmetric warfare is already causing enormous strain on the some 6 Israeli divisions deployed to fight against Lebanon. Just as they were in Gaza, the Israelis are not doing much beyond demolishing civilian infrastructure, proving so risk-averse as to fear entering a fight in which they actually seek to degrade Hezbollah in any significant way. They may have gotten away with this in Gaza, but in South Lebanon, they are dealing with a much more powerful opponent and a more difficult terrain.
Israeli Merkava tanks, worth between 3.5 to 6 million dollars each, are being taken out day after day by FPV drones, carrying explosive charges, worth a maximum of a few hundred dollars each. Hezbollah is taking out mobile telecommunications equipment, command and control vehicles, APCs, D-9 bulldozers, and excavation equipment, with cheap drones that they continue to mass produce with ease. They also do this while their fighters are kept out of harm’s way.
Israel has attempted to consult Ukrainian advisors in order to learn new tactics to deal with the threat and has purchased its own FPV drones, yet none of this has borne fruit. Instead, individual soldiers have tried experimenting with netting to place over vehicles and the use of shotguns, while relying on soldiers to watch the skies for incoming drones.
Despite some of this being effective, out of fear, the Israelis do not normally deploy infantry next to their tanks while on the move. In Gaza, this tactic of hiding inside heavily armored vehicles and tanks did manage to reduce soldier deaths and injuries, but in Lebanon, it could actually be causing the opposite effect, at least when it comes to FPV drone attacks.
Robert Inlakesh
Source: The Palestine Chronicle